

(CLASSIFICATION)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM

## OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM No. 64

DATE 27 October 1962

### MEMORANDUM FOR:

DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT)  
COMPTROLLER  
INSPECTOR GENERAL  
GENERAL COUNSEL  
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
FOR NATIONAL ESTIMATES

LBK:dm

Distribution: TO ALL ADDRESSEES

1 - Col. Grogan

1 - ER via DCI, DDCI

NOTE: Copies to DD/I and Col. Grogan were fwd'd 26 Oct.

This memorandum contains information for the addressees. Addressees may give this memorandum additional circulation within their components as required. All copies should be destroyed not filed, upon completion of circulation. A master file will be kept in the Executive Director's Office and will be available upon request.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY,

(CLASSIFICATION)

62 7850

October 26, 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter**

**SUBJECT: Press Contacts in Connection with the Cuban Crisis**

I note a growing amount of press comment indicating that the Cuban situation developed precipitously for one or two reasons: (a) information was withheld from the public, or (b) intelligence was faulty or inadequate.

Our line therefore should be about as follows:

The MRBM and IRBM areas were surveyed on August 29th and September 5th and there was no evidence of any construction activity or unusual movements of material, etc. Subsequent reconnaissance efforts in late September and early October were ineffective because of bad weather and the flights that were successful concentrated on developing essential information on known installations such as SAM sites, cruise missile sites, etc. Information was obtained in mid-September on the arrival of large crates suspected of containing fuselages of IL-28s but the planes themselves could not be detected as no crates were opened.

The first effective flight revealing significant information occurred on October 14th after several days' delay because of weather and this flight revealed the fuselage of one IL-28 which had been uncrated, the location of the remaining crates, and the evidence of some MRBM sites. The most advanced apparently had been under construction for a few days. Subsequent flights revealed progressive construction of the MRBM sites, additional MRBM sites being commenced and initial construction on the first of the IRBM sites, also a substantial number of MIG 21s (crates of which had been previously noted and reported) in being on the runway and one crate unloaded and the plane being placed in operational status.

One can only conclude that what we observed had been carefully planned for execution in a very minimum time in the interests of avoiding detection.

I am told there are a number of articles in preparation, some of which wish to deal with the role of intelligence in the findings and subsequent decision. Some writers have expressed a desire to do a profile on me personally. I would like both my personal role and the role of intelligence played down.

We might confine ourselves to the following:

On the evening of Monday, October 15th, analysis of photographs taken on Sunday, October 14th, revealed the probable evidence of medium range missiles in Cuba. This probability was reported to the White House Tuesday morning and McCone, who was on that day in Seattle to attend the funeral of his stepson who had been killed on the 14th in an accident, was advised and returned to Washington on the first available plane.

The Central Intelligence Agency and the entire Intelligence Community worked continuously on analyzing the photographic product and preparing the necessary appraisals and estimates needed for proper policy consideration and decisions. The United States Intelligence Board made up of senior intelligence officers from CIA, State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force and Atomic Energy Commission met every day and sometimes more often to consider current intelligence and estimates as they evolved. Subcommittees of the Board were in continuous session. As a result the President and his policy advisors were currently supplied with a coordinated and considered judgment of the critical situation. McCone personally attended all meetings of the senior Government officials and with the National Security Council and with the President in considering the alternative courses of action and reaching final decision as to the course we have followed. McCone, as a principal intelligence officer of the Government, continues to meet daily as a member of the Presidential appointive Executive Committee of the NSC.

John F. McCone  
Director

cc: General Carter

Dist: 22/11, Excl: 22/11, 22/11

62-7929

XR Exec Memo  
#64

DD/R 691-62

29 October 1962

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Director of Central Intelligence

**SUBJECT:** Press Contacts in Connection with the Cuban Crisis

**REFERENCE:** Memorandum for General Carter from DCI, dated 26 October 1962, subject: Same as Above

I have noted your referenced memorandum relative to press contacts in connection with the Cuban crisis and will attempt to follow the line indicated. I should like, however, to suggest one change in the second sentence of the first paragraph of the proposed line, which I believe is more in accord with the facts and also makes a better case for our activities. I believe that our successful flights in September and early October concentrated on developing information on areas not previously covered by photography since the August build-up, rather than obtaining reconvergence of the areas which had shown no evidence of unusual activity or in which known SAM sites existed. This coverage of new areas was aimed at obtaining information on additional SAM sites, cruise missile sites and any other military installations which might exist.

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.  
Deputy Director  
(Research)

cc: EDCI  
DD/I  
Executive Director  
Colonel Grogan

(EXECUTIVE ACTION)

DDR

TO: <i>Exec. Dir.</i>		DATE: <i>5/29</i>
ROOM NO.	BUILDING <i>18K</i>	
REMARKS:		
FROM: <i>DD/K</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

GPO : 1957-O-439445

(47)

ER - a copy of  
this shd be  
filed (or cross  
referenced) with  
Exec Memo 64.

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<b>CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY</b> <b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>		
<b>TO</b>	<b>NAME AND ADDRESS</b>	<b>DATE</b>
1	O/DCI	10/29/62
2	O/DDCI	11/1/62
3	ER	
4		
5		
6		
<b>ACTION</b>	<b>DIRECT REPLY</b>	<b>PREPARE REPLY</b>
<b>APPROVAL</b>	<b>DISPATCH</b>	<b>RECOMMENDATION</b>
<b>COMMENT</b>	<b>FILE</b>	<b>RETURN</b>
<b>CONCURRENCE</b>	<b>INFORMATION</b>	<b>SIGNATURE</b>
<b>Remarks:</b>		
<b>FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER</b>		
<b>FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.</b>  ExDir		<b>DATE</b>  29 Oct
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